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This is a good book if you are interested in a very detailed description of the Battle of France, 1940 Having been an Army officer, and served in an ard cavalry unit, I have always wondered how the Germans pulled this off how did they defeat the French Army, which was equivalent in size, hadartillery and roughly equal numbers of tanks, in just six weeks It is interesting to hear the answer from a German military historian, because it is rather different than what one hears from Bri This is a good book if you are interested in a very detailed description of the Battle of France, 1940 Having been an Army officer, and served in an ard cavalry unit, I have always wondered how the Germans pulled this off how did they defeat the French Army, which was equivalent in size, hadartillery and roughly equal numbers of tanks, in just six weeks It is interesting to hear the answer from a German military historian, because it is rather different than what one hears from British or American historians Let me first get my quibbles out of the way First, Herr Frieser overrates the French Air Force, in my opinion The Armee de l Air did not have a single fighter equivalent in quality to the ME 109 in 1940 The Dewoitine 520 which was a rough match for the 109, had not yet been delivered to the French Air Force in numbers, and no units equipped with the Dewoitine 520 were operational Also, Churchill held back the greater part of RAF from supporting the French from French bases, and significantly, he held back the Spitfires, which were a match for the ME 109 So the Germans had air superiority until Dunkirk, when the RAF began flying in in bitter earnest in support of the British Army in the Dunkirk pocket Second, Frieser goes out of his way to say how weak the Germans were relative to the French British While much of what he says is true, like citing the amount of armor of size of cannons on tanks, I think he somewhat overstates the case to make the Germans look evenimpressive But this is, as I said at the outset, a quibble, not a major flaw in the book.The other small complaint I have is that the book is almost too detailed But this is easily overcome by skimming the sections that deal with, for example, The Raid on Mouzaive, Or the Niwi Airlanding, and this fault is largely obviated by the placement of summaries at the end of most major sections of the book And some of the detailed sections are interesting in how they reveal tactics and mindset of the German forces.The Germans defeated the French and British by using massed panzer divisions to break through the Allied line at Sedan, and then by getting into the rear areas and sowing panic and destroying logistics and reserve forces that were parked bivouac d and not deployed for combat Then they drove to the coast and would have destroyed the British Army at Dunkirk if not for Hitler s three day halt order.So, the author s major points are the following The breakout of the Germans through the French lines at Sedan almost did not happen It was not really part of the high command s plan In large part, it happened because panzer commanders, Guderian and Rommel, disobeyed orders, and attacked and kept moving, until they were stopped by Hitler in front of Dunkirk It also happened because the Allied air forces inexplicably ignored an opportunity to destroy German panzer divisions transiting the Ardennes French and British battlefield communication via radio were horrible, while German use of radios was excellent each tank had a radio , and their command and control skills had been honed by repeated training exercises More generally, German leadership was energetic and bold Among the Allies, the generals were simply too old for the jobs they had, and all of their thinking was circa 1918 They could not deal with the incredibly fast pace of German panzer operations German generals, Guderian and Rommel in particular, led their units from the front so they were able to make decisions on the spot, lead by example, and drive their units forward Allied generals simply did not do this the model was the headquarters well to the rear as in WW1 Critically, the Germans understood the need to use panzer divisions, operating as separate attack forces, massed at key Schwerpunkt points The Allies were still using WW1 tactics where tanks could not advance faster than the infantry.The German approach to war was active, the Allied approach was passive defense.One interesting anecdote I did not know was that Hitler was shocked when the UK and France declared war on him after his invasion of Poland He sat with von Ribbentrop, the Foreign Minister, looking paralyzed with fear, and kept asking Ribbentrop, in an accusatory tone, What now But since there was no real action by the Allies against Germany for nine months following their declarations, it ultimately meant little to the outcome in 1940.Part of the reason Guderian s river crossing at Sedan worked is that he had established an excellent working relationship with the commander of Luftwaffe forces in his sector, and the commander cooperated with Guderian in ignoring orders from higher HQ that would have changed the attack plan at the last minute to something much less bold The Luftwaffe provided a rolling barrage , bombing French positions across the river to substitute for the artillery that the Germans lacked This was critical to demoralizing the French forces and allowing Guderian s forces to get across.The author points out clearly how much Hitler s halt order at Dunkirk cost the Germans the Germans could have literally destroyed or captured the greater part of the British Army with one final attack, but instead, the halt gave the British and French time to establish a defense in depth in front of the Germans, and for the British to organize the evacuation of 300,000 of their trained soldiers The author points out that this was made possible by the bitter defense put up by the 80,000 French troops who stayed behind and ultimately became prisoner Frieser calls Hitler s halt order the greatest mistake of WW2, and, in fact, it s hard to think of a bigger one And by the way, his feeling was that the order was given, not because of any sentimental feelings by Hitler about the Brits, but because he was a having another attack of nerves, and b arguing with his generals So incompetence was the primary factor, not kindness.Ultimately the French soldiers were failed by their leaders The French generals were stuck in the past in the 1930 s they failed to modernize their tactics, their air force, and their communications ability, despite clear evidence of the path the German Army was taking in modernization, and 120,000 French soldiers paid the price in 1940 for the generals willful blindness Individual French units fought bravely, and French tankers were particularly feared by the Germans, but their actions were not coordinated by the generals quickly enough, in such a way as to stop the Germans, which at many points would have been entirely possible Only de Gaulle, commanding a tank division, made a really successful attack against the German flank after the breakout, but by then it was too little too late.Two final points which were very perceptive observations by the author The failure to destroy the British Army meant that Britain stayed in the war, and that Hitler had a two front war to deal with after he attacked Russia, and it also meant that ultimately the US came to Britain s aid This disaster for Germany could have been avoided, because despite Churchill s bold talk, there would have been no way for the British to stop the professional German army with British reservists and territorials if the Germans had mounted a cross channel attack in Summer 1940 Britain would have fallen like Poland and France Instead, 40 German divisions were pinned down for years in the west, waiting for the Allies to attack cross channel, and those divisions could have been used in Russia in 1941 As close as the Germans came to taking Moscow, it is hard to believe that an additional 40 divisions would not have turned the tide there The second point is that the German success in 1940 was like a drug to Hitler this tactical success, largely the result of an unlikely smaller tactical success at Sedan, led Hitler to believe his Armies were invincible He failed to grasp that strategically he had failed by not knocking Britain out of the war, and that ultimately, the industrial economies of the US and USSR would crank out enough weapons to crush him If you read US history, it is hard to believe that the US would have tried to help a UK that had lost its Army, just as they did not try to help France So in that scenario, the US would never have come into the war against Germany But, of course, this is all speculation Thank God Hitler made the mistakes he did.If you are interested in this subject, Marc Bloch s book, Strange Defeat, gives perspective from the French side, and William Styron s The Fall of the Third Republic is also helpful And there are many other military histories of 1940 by British and American writers, but I find Frieser s account better than most of those,fair to all involved This volume, part of the German official history of the Second World War, must stand as a classic example of the General Staff tradition of history Frieser demonstrates the typical German focus on essentials the aspects of the campaign in Belgium and the Netherlands, and then after the Dunkirk evacuation, are treated almost in passing, as the key element of the campaign was the development of the operational plan and the thrust by the panzer forces through Sedan and to the sea.This is no triu This volume, part of the German official history of the Second World War, must stand as a classic example of the General Staff tradition of history Frieser demonstrates the typical German focus on essentials the aspects of the campaign in Belgium and the Netherlands, and then after the Dunkirk evacuation, are treated almost in passing, as the key element of the campaign was the development of the operational plan and the thrust by the panzer forces through Sedan and to the sea.This is no triumphalist account not that one would expect such a thing from a modern German Frieser focuses as much of his attention on demonstrating that the campaign led to the development of the concept of Blitzkrieg, rather than being an expression of it, and that the concept was fundamentally flawed He is also merciless in revealing the many and frequent errors made by the German forces.What makes the book so powerful, however, is its concentration on the element of command, which Frieser continually demonstrates was the critical factor in the outcome of the campaign Despite their inferior numbers and equipment, the German commanders were able to draw upon an approach to command that was based on low level initiative, rapid decision making, a complete focus on the critical point, and boldness in seizing fleeting opportunities as they arose By contrast, the French commanders sought to maintain an even linear posture, with all details controlled by the most senior officers, placed far behind the front line Frieser brings out the impact of their passive reliance on following outdated orders, coupled with a terror of being outflanked.In short, this should be the starting point for anyone wanting to understand why the 1940 campaign turned out as it did, as well as readers looking for an example of military history writing at its very best As part of the planning for the megagame War in the West I bought myself a copy of Blitzkrieg Legend because it is the German Army s official history although it didn t get written until the 1990s.From reading the first couple of chapters and looking through the maps you can see the evolution of the German plan You can see why the directive was written the way that it was in October 1939.The most interesting thing for me is that there is no concept of a lightning war, the general staffs hig As part of the planning for the megagame War in the West I bought myself a copy of Blitzkrieg Legend because it is the German Army s official history although it didn t get written until the 1990s.From reading the first couple of chapters and looking through the maps you can see the evolution of the German plan You can see why the directive was written the way that it was in October 1939.The most interesting thing for me is that there is no concept of a lightning war, the general staffs high command all believe that the start of the world war was a gross mistake and spells certain doom for Germany as being too soon to be winnable the strong belief is that the strength of the economy is what wins wars, not surprise attacks and for my money they were right After the planning phase there is a fairly detailed examination of the attacks themselves What becomes clear is how lucky the Germans were, although some of this is down to the way that the 100,000 man army has trained its troops, and this training continues into the expanded army It is human factors rather than technology that makes the blitzkreig work The Germans were exceedingly lucky, when they infiltrate forward and put small parties over rivers and obstacle the enemy retires rather than counter attacks I would certainly recommend this book strongly to anyone who has an interest in WW2, and particularly the Fall of France in 1940 This book was excellent For those interested in the study of warfare, it is essential Unfortunately, I am unable to find his other book, German Military Operations on the Eastern Front, 1943 44 I think that this book would serve as a fascinating comparison in the application of maneuver warfare when the enemy has its back to a coast versus the vastness of the Russian state Blitzkrieg Legend illuminates several myths about Germany s 1940 campaign in France First, that the French were subp This book was excellent For those interested in the study of warfare, it is essential Unfortunately, I am unable to find his other book, German Military Operations on the Eastern Front, 1943 44 I think that this book would serve as a fascinating comparison in the application of maneuver warfare when the enemy has its back to a coast versus the vastness of the Russian state Blitzkrieg Legend illuminates several myths about Germany s 1940 campaign in France First, that the French were subpar soldiers and or the Germans were superior soldiers second, that the Germans overwhelmed the Allies with numerical superiority third, that the German General Staff was aware of, had been indoctrinated into, and agreed upon a strategy of Blitzkrieg fourth, that Germany had a political and popular will for the invasion of France fifth, the miracle at Dunkirk was no miracle at all In each case the author dismantles these myths with fact The sum of this illumination is that the German Army s success was due to decentralized control of the execution of a brilliant operational plan which at the time was viewed as risky and potentially disastrous.There were two things that bothered me about the book First, it is interesting that the book was written by a German Army colonel throughout the book he seems to be defending the German Army and underscoring Hitler s madness However, recognizing this bias early did not change my reading of the text or undermine his analysis.Second, Col Frieser consistently mentions that the nature of warfare has changed, but I think that he simply is using the wrong word as he then describes characteristics of warfare and discusses almost nothing above the operational level of war [ DOWNLOAD ] ♙ The Blitzkrieg Legend ⚖ Here, for the first time in English, is an illuminating new German perspective on the decisive Blitzkrieg campaign ofKarl Heinz Frieser s account provides the definitive explanation for Germany s startling success and the equally surprising and rapid military collapse of France and Britain on the European continent In a little over a month, Germany decisively defeated the Allies in battle, a task that had not been achieved in four years of brutal fighting during World War I First published inas the official German history of thecampaign in the west, the book goes beyond standard explanations to show that German victory was not inevitable and French defeat was not preordained Contrary to the usual accounts of the campaign, Frieser illustrates that the military systems of both Germany and France were solid and that their campaign planning was sound The key to victory or defeat, he argues, was the execution of operational plans both preplanned and ad hoc amid the eternal Clausewitzian combat factors of friction and the fog of war Frieser shows why on the eve of the campaign the British and French leaders had good cause to be confident and why many German generals were understandably concerned that disaster was looming for them This study explodes many of the myths concerning German Blitzkrieg warfare and the planning for thecampaign A groundbreaking new interpretation of a topic that has long interested students of military history, it is being published in cooperation with the Association of the US Army To Kill a Nudist-Book III of the Nudist Series for the first time in English Adkar is an illuminating new German perspective on the decisive Blitzkrieg campaign ofKarl Heinz Frieser s account provides the definitive explanation for Germany s startling success and the equally surprising and rapid military collapse of France and Britain on the European continent In a little over a month Joe Smith (Jobless in January, Germany decisively defeated the Allies in battle Cruel Enchantment (Dark Magick, a task that had not been achieved in four years of brutal fighting during World War I First published inas the official German history of thecampaign in the west My Cherished Enemy the book goes beyond standard explanations to show that German victory was not inevitable and French defeat was not preordained Contrary to the usual accounts of the campaign The Scholomance Frieser illustrates that the military systems of both Germany and France were solid and that their campaign planning was sound The key to victory or defeat Hairy Charlie and the Frog he argues Game Time was the execution of operational plans both preplanned and ad hoc amid the eternal Clausewitzian combat factors of friction and the fog of war Frieser shows why on the eve of the campaign the British and French leaders had good cause to be confident and why many German generals were understandably concerned that disaster was looming for them This study explodes many of the myths concerning German Blitzkrieg warfare and the planning for thecampaign A groundbreaking new interpretation of a topic that has long interested students of military history Nowhere Girl (Dolly Fiction, it is being published in cooperation with the Association of the US Army I am being distracted now by reading Frieser s The Blitzkrieg Legend about the German attack on France in 1940 This in preparation for the War in the West megagame in May Although not on topic, it is interesting to see WWI influencing German and French decision making a generation later Friesser makes a direct comparison of the two German war plans, saying that they both required co operation of the enemy to succeed And while the French both cases dutifully stuck their heads in the trap, t I am being distracted now by reading Frieser s The Blitzkrieg Legend about the German attack on France in 1940 This in preparation for the War in the West megagame in May Although not on topic, it is interesting to see WWI influencing German and French decision making a generation later Friesser makes a direct comparison of the two German war plans, saying that they both required co operation of the enemy to succeed And while the French both cases dutifully stuck their heads in the trap, the Schlieffen plan failed because the German troops on the weak flank Alsace Lorraine threw back the French attacks This made it easier for the French to effect the strategic redistribution of troops to the threatened area around Paris, once they spotted the danger Also the French and German strategic planners planned for a long war in 1940, trusting that strategic breakthrough was impossible Therefore, the French airforce held back many airplanes for later use and the Germans called up many half and untrained troops.I was distracted from Friesser by my brother s PhD, but now back on track Should have it finished before the megagame in two weeks I m trying to get a grip of the speed of advance in this war In WWI a few miles a day is considered lightning At Sedan on May 13th 1940, the German infantry supported mostly by air attacks, tanks not crossing the Meuse until the morning of the 14th advances two miles in 4 hours Pretty good by WWI, I d say But the French could have dealt with that Friesser gives an interesting comparison of French and German activities from the German river crossing on the 13th 1600 hours to the meeting engagement next morning While it took the French 15 hours to transmit the orders for attack and then to get to the starting line, the Germans were sent straight into battle coming from the bridge in an hour and 15 minutes So the Germans had both the speed of the tanks, combined with the speed of command While the book has its share of problems in the second half, the first half is a terrific perspective on the conquest of France in 1940, how it was a tremendous gamble for the Nazis and how the strategy was born of desperation and later over interpreted by victors and vanquished alike The title refers to the fact that blitzkrieg didn t really exist yet at this time, and the series of gambles and improvisations would be retroactively knit together into a narrative It s well written, well tran While the book has its share of problems in the second half, the first half is a terrific perspective on the conquest of France in 1940, how it was a tremendous gamble for the Nazis and how the strategy was born of desperation and later over interpreted by victors and vanquished alike The title refers to the fact that blitzkrieg didn t really exist yet at this time, and the series of gambles and improvisations would be retroactively knit together into a narrative It s well written, well translated, and offers a fresh perspective.When it veers towards German nationalism in the second half, it goes a bit off the rails It spends a considerable amount of time trying to figure out who was to blame for the halt orders that took the pressure off the evacuating BEF momentarily, and appears to be lamenting that the war could have been won then and there Let s remember here Hitler the Nazis, and the Germans in this context were bad dudes He is also constantly playing up the inferiority of German tanks, which is certainly debatable lack of radios, one man turrets, very limited operating range, and exposed exhaust ports were serious technical deficiencies in French armor, which he does admit, but never makes it into the tables of weapon and armor thickness specs.Anyway, this is still really interesting reading for students of the period, and has many great insights Just be prepared to filter the PoV from time to time With the title as is, most people are going to say no to this book from the get to That s fair, this one is not for everyone But if you like reading military history and enjoying interesting analysis, this book is for you Frieser attacks a number of notions in this book Notably, that Germany and Hitler in particular dreamed up a blitzkrieg strategy because of their economy and then revealed it to the world Rather, Frieser argues, blitzkrieg arose as an operational response to a troubling st With the title as is, most people are going to say no to this book from the get to That s fair, this one is not for everyone But if you like reading military history and enjoying interesting analysis, this book is for you Frieser attacks a number of notions in this book Notably, that Germany and Hitler in particular dreamed up a blitzkrieg strategy because of their economy and then revealed it to the world Rather, Frieser argues, blitzkrieg arose as an operational response to a troubling strategic situation Hitler gambled that France and Britain would not respond to the attack on Poland having lost that bet, the country was in a pickle The staff and Hitler had a range of unworkable plans and it was only for a fortuitous for Germany, for the rest of the world not so much chain of circumstances that allowed Germany to prevail The analysis of German military history, strategic culture, planning and policy are fantastic I also found his reading of the Halt Order convincing.I did find the tactical descriptions a bit much, but you don t need to read them closely to understand his argument Karl Heinz Frieser offers a well written and well researched account of Germany s 1940 campaign in France and the genesis of the form of warfare that came to be known as blitzkreig Frieser s primary thesis which is well and convincingly supported is that what we now refer to as blitzkreig was not the predominant doctrine for land warfare for the Wehrmacht at the time Frieser goes on to show that the wild success of the German campaign in May 1940 was dueto the daring and insubordinat Karl Heinz Frieser offers a well written and well researched account of Germany s 1940 campaign in France and the genesis of the form of warfare that came to be known as blitzkreig Frieser s primary thesis which is well and convincingly supported is that what we now refer to as blitzkreig was not the predominant doctrine for land warfare for the Wehrmacht at the time Frieser goes on to show that the wild success of the German campaign in May 1940 was dueto the daring and insubordination of commanders such as Heinz Guderian and Erwin Rommel Frieser clearly shows and supports his premise that onthan one occasion Guderian and Rommel willfully chose to ignore orders and continued tto press the attack well beyond what was explicitly authorized.In addition to being a well written account of the German invasion of France, it is a good study in the development of military theory.Highly recommended for the serious student not only of the Second World War, but also for the student of the development of military theory The German invasion of France in 1940 remains one of the most popularly discussed battles in modern military history One of the prevailing views of this campaign is that Germany, with superior equipment and a brilliant master plan, simply rolled over the unprepared French army Karl Heinz Frieser, through a detailed analysis of German archival sources, attempts to show that this was not at all the case Frieser in fact convincingly demonstrates that the so called blitzkrieg was not a grand plan The German invasion of France in 1940 remains one of the most popularly discussed battles in modern military history One of the prevailing views of this campaign is that Germany, with superior equipment and a brilliant master plan, simply rolled over the unprepared French army Karl Heinz Frieser, through a detailed analysis of German archival sources, attempts to show that this was not at all the case Frieser in fact convincingly demonstrates that the so called blitzkrieg was not a grand plan at all, but rather a desperate gamble whose success rested on the latitude given to its improvising generals.Frieser displays clearly that, while blitzkrieg tactics were hailed as a revolution in warfare, they were not actually a completely new idea Towards the end of World War One, Germany had begun to use infantry assault tactics which served them well, bringing movement back into the stalemate that was emblematic of that conflict In many ways, the approach that would eventually be called blitzkrieg though not by the Germans at first was nothing but the further development of the original assault team idea Rommel was perhaps the greatest exemplar of this idea He led his Panzers like an infantry assault detachment and employed the same infiltration tactics he had when he was an Oberleutnant during World War I In this sense, the blitzkrieg was simply a new application of an old idea, made possible by technological advances.Such changes in technology are incredibly important to the 1940 Case Yellow campaign, and Frieser gives them ample consideration He amply busts several myths regarding the available forces and equipment on each side, surprisingly demonstrating the Allies clear advantage against Germany s weaker forces, which were not nearly as advanced as many have come to believe Among the 157 divisions that the German army had in May 1940, only 16, about 10 percent, were fully motorized one might well describe the German army as semimodern Frieser applies this German inferiority to all areas, both qualitative and quantitative Germany had fewer troops, less equipment, and inferior equipment, showing that Case Yellow was a massive gambit Frieser includes several useful charts and graphs which illustrate this disparity wonderfully However, there is one technological advantage on the German side radio While France had radio available to them, they had not made use of it extensively The advantage that instant radio communication between tank commanders gave to Germany can hardly be understated While the French were hampered by a lack of communication, the Germans were coordinated and quick Huge formations attacked as if governed by a single will This was one major ingredient that allowed Germany s inferior numbers to achieve victory.Frieser shows that the main ingredient, however, was the initiative of individual leaders By granting extensive leeway to individual commanders, the German army was able to move far quicker than anticipated However, many commanders took this further, and pursued objectives of their own, in spite of their orders Increasingly, the Panzer generals ignored the instructions from their superiors, whom they considered to be reactionary Guderian demonstrated this tendencyso than other generals, making decisive decisions that paid off in the end Frieser notes that Guderian not only violated the clear orders given him by his superior plus Hitler s instruction but he also went against all rules of the art of warfare Guderian s initiative had wrested the controls from the hands of the general officer corps on the operational echelon The operation increasingly took on a dynamism of its own Such initiative contributed to the blistering speed with which the German army was able to attack This speed was not simply operationally beneficial, but created a severe psychological effect which enhanced German effectiveness.Frieser demonstrates that the methods used by Guderian and other commanders was not necessarily part of the German plan of action, and were certainly not part of a pre planned strategy of blitzkrieg Instead of focusing on tactics, the German command placed an emphasis on the mission as a whole Frieser emphasizes this point, noting, The important thing was not to translate an as yet undeveloped blitzkrieg strategy into operational tactical terms Instead the task was to accomplish an extraordinary mission All the many extraordinary methods that were analyzed in general staff terms only later and were then turned into an abstract system that propaganda journalism referred to as blitzkrieg While this ability to improvise and even countermand orders allowed Germany to achieve victory by unplanned methods, it also created friction with leadership Nearing the end of the campaign, when Germany was near to capturing the bulk of the enemy forces in a powerful encirclement battle, German forces received an order to halt This decision essentially granted the allies enough time to evacuate the bulk of their forces in the Miracle of Dunkirk This halt order has been the subject of much debate, and, as with many other topics in the book, Frieser spends a great deal of time dealing with the many myths surrounding this mysterious order After debunking many common reasons historians give to explain the halt order, Frieser ends on the shocking conclusion that Hitler was concerned with establishing his own personal authority, above all tactical or strategic considerations Hitler wanted to stop not the Panzers but the general officers corps in the army high command He was simply concerned with a basic principle, the F hrer Prinzip F hrer principle Everything was to be oriented toward his person and that applied especially to the military leadership Frieser, while elsewhere taking a generally balanced view, has almost nothing positive to say regarding Hitler, showing that he was not a tactical or strategic genius as if often depicted Frieser rather describes Hitler as under the spell of his Caesar mania A frightening amateur slipped on the far too big warlord s cloak and finally led the victorious army into catastrophe While Frieser spends much of the book debunking old views and challenging previous claims, he does not do so haphazardly His arguments are backed up through extensive research in the primary documents of German military archives There are a full eighty pages of diligently sourced footnotes in addition to a fifty seven page bibliography that includes archival primary sources and many useful secondary sources This impressive scholarly apparatus lends weight to his views as well as providing a useful list for further research Frieser also provides incredibly helpful charts and a surprisingly large number of full color maps that illustrate the campaigns wonderfully In a final effort to be as complete as possible, the many photographs included are all relevant to the discussions on their surrounding pages, which is refreshing and often insightful.Frieser s deconstruction of the 1940 campaign clearly shows that the famous blitzkrieg was not a preconceived strategy of genius, but rather an improvised, desperate roll of the dice The proliferation of the myth of Germany s genius in fact caused many German leaders to believe in their own hype, leading to a hubris that would come back to haunt them later in the war The Blitzkrieg Legend fully lives up to its title, systematically debunking the many myths surrounding Case Yellow in a clear, direct style Providing a welcome, unique viewpoint and extensive inventory of important sources, the book is a welcome addition to any shelf